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KILLING A FLY WITH A CANNON:
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO
THE EMBASSY ATTACKS
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 7, 1998, two American embassies in Eastern Africa were the
targets of terrorist attacks, which led to the unexpected death of more than
250 people and the injury of over 5,000.' Bombs simultaneously exploded
at the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, paralyzing those two
countries and frightening the rest of the Western world.2 Fundamentalist
Islamic factions have been linked to these assaults. Reporters allege that
these groups are fronted by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi millionaire who has
turned his efforts towards uniting Muslims around the world in the name of
Allah, while gaining popularity among the more violent factions of the
Islamic world.4
America immediately responded to these terrorist attacks.5 On August
20, 1998, President Clinton, attempting to flush out bin Laden and punish
those linked to him, ordered a cruise missile attack on a remote site in
Afghanistan, the state offering bin Laden asylum.6 President Clinton also
1. Myint Zan, No Justification for U.S. Attacks Under International Law, NEW STRAITS
TIMES (Malaysia), Aug. 31, 1998, at 12.
2. Barton Gellman,A War in Which Success is Elusive, WASH. POST, Aug. 22,1998, at Al.
3. U.S. War on Terror Leaves Allies Shell-Shocked, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 28, 1998. See
also, Julian West, NairobiBomb Suspect Confesses, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 16, 1998, at
7; Louise Tunbridge, Embassy Bombs Suspect is Extradited to Kenya, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Aug. 17, 1998, at 12; FBI, Kenya Police Question Suspect, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 17,
1998, at3 1 C; Africa Bombs Suspect Held, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug. 17, 1998, at 1;
Candice Hughes, No Leads from Suspect in Bombings, FBI Says, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 18,
1998, at 1; Pakistan Arrests Three in Bombing Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998, at A11;
Yemeni Suspect Indicted for Bombing of Embassy, EVENING POST (Washington), Aug. 28,
1998, at 7; Taliban Probes bin Laden Role, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 1998, at A22.
4. Barton Gellman & Dana Priest, US. Strikes Terrorist-Linked Sites in Afghanistan,
Factory in Sudan, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al. See also Arthur Kent, A Deadly
Organization's Flawed Leader, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Aug. 27, 1998, at B7.
5. Fighting Terror; Air-Strikes Justified, But Clinton Doubted, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug.
23, 1998, at 2B.
6. Eugene Robinson & Dana Priest, Reports of US. Strikes Destruction Vary; Afghanistan
Damage Moderate to Heavy, Sudan Plant Leveled, WASH. POST, Aug. 22,1998, at Al.
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ordered attacks on Sudan, where Laden was allegedly producing chemical
weapons.7
These strikes are reminiscent of the 1993 U.S. attack on Iraq in response
to a foiled assassination plot on President Bush.8 The American "counter-"
attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan portray a dramatically different terrorism
from the one of ten years ago.9 The American response is unique in kind
because it is the first involving an international investigation in pursuit of a
single criminal whom the country holds responsible for acts of terrorism.°
Accordingly, the hunt for bin Laden is of particular significance in the arena
of international politics and law." The American cruise missile attacks were
motivated by deterrence, retaliation, and self-defense. 2 They are the first
involving a state deploying and justifying military action under the United
Nations ("U.N.") Charter to find a single "criminal" not sponsored by a state
government.
Since the American attacks, numerous questions have arisen while the
West tries to make sense of terrorist violence. 3 What is terrorism? Under
what circumstances may a victim state lawfully respond with armed force to
an incidence of violence? How broadly should the U.N. Charter be read in
granting a state the power to attack another state? Can the U.N. Charter be
interpreted to justify bombing a hosting nation not involved in the terrorist
actions the state is responding to? The time has come to focus on these
questions.
Part I of this Note analyzes the difficulties in defining "terrorism."' 4 Part
II looks at the relationship between the contemporary law of war-jus ad
bellum-and the problem of international terrorism. Part III focuses on post-
1945 state practices in response to terrorism. 15 Part IV analyzes the various
7. Id.
8. See generally Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, Don't Tread on Us: International
Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L.J. 153 (1994).
9. Stephen J. Hedges, Bin Laden Just One ofMany; U.S. Overestimates Indicted Terrorist's
Reach, Experts Say, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1998, at 1.
10. Barton Gellman, US. Missile Strikes Highlight Complexities of War Against Terror,
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Aug. 22, 1998, at 4A.
11. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 155.
12. Gellman, supra note 10, at A4.
13. See Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self-Defense
and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243 (1987).
14. See, e.g., Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 156.
15. Id.
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interpretations of the U.N. Charter, specifically Article 51,16 in relation to bin
Laden's extraordinary rise to power and his involvement in both terrorism
and the East African Embassy bombings. This Note concludes that the
attitudes of the U.N. and sovereign states toward terrorism have changed
radically over the past century, leading to new interpretations of international
law and fundamental changes in state responsive actions to terrorism.
II. DEFINING TERRORISM
International law is created by a fundamentally different process than
domestic state law.17 International law is the sum of rules to which states
have consented to be bound. For the most part, a state cannot be bound to a
law to which it has not consented. 8 Thus, in a decentralized, non-
hierarchical international law system, states are simultaneously the creators
and the subjects of international law. 9 The U.N. Charter is an example of a
body which incorporates these dual state roles.2 °
The laws of the U.N. govern international actions taken by its members.
To determine whether a state response is subject to its laws, the U.N. must
first determine whether member states have consented to the action the state
wants to take. Second, it must ascertain how the U.N. defines the cause for
the state response.
Defining terrorism is essential because while a state's actions may be
morally reprehensible, they may not necessarily be legally prohibited.2 A
clear definition of terrorism would enable the U.N. and the international
community to determine under which body of law, if any, a given state act
falls.
What exactly is terrorism? Is there a common international understanding
of the term? If anything, there can be little doubt of terrorism's brutality or
its capacity to capture worldwide attention.22 We seem to "know what
terrorism is when we see it."2 3 However, as a nation and as a member state
in the U.N., we are unable to reach a consensus about what the term means.
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
17. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 200.





23. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
It is true that terrorism cannot be easily defined.24 While many countries,
including the United States ("U.S."), have made attempts,25 no definition of
terrorism has been adopted by the U.N. or any multilateral treaty.26 Part of
the difficulty in finding an acceptable international definition is that terrorism
does not have meaning in any particular legal doctrine.27 However, it is
possible to find characteristic elements of the phenomenon among the
plethora of formal definitions of terrorism." Essentially, a terrorist act is
distinguished by three qualities:
(1) violence, whether actual or threatened;
(2) a "political objective", however conceived (inclusive ofreligious
objectives); and
(3) an intended audience, though not exclusively a wide one.29
While this framework provides us with a tentative working definition of
terrorist acts, it fails to represent a consensus on a definition of the broader
topic of terrorism.3"
States regularly threaten or use violence with an intent to cause fear in
certain groups to achieve a political objective.31 One need only think of the
governmental threats and violence inflicted on Mayan populations in
Guatemala to see how established powers strong-arm the weak for such
24. Thomas M. Franck & Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., Preliminary Thoughts Towards an
International Convention on Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 73 n. 23 (1974).
25. Id.
26. Oscar Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use ofForceAgainst TerroristBases, 11 HOUS.
J. INT'L L. 309 (1989).
27. R.R. Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380
(1974).
28. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 161.
29. Id. at 162.
30. Id.
31. See generally FREDERICK SuAREz-RcHARD, UN ENCUENTRO CON LAT1NO AMERICA
(1992).
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reasons as the appropriation of land.32 While this violence may generally not
be regarded as terrorism per se, many argue differently."
Viewed from the perspective of U.N. law, the American attacks on
Afghanistan and Sudan, which killed innocent civilians and landed
unexploded missile heads in the Pakistani desert,34 are justifiable. If legal
restrictions on a particular state behavior are absent, sovereign states may act
as they choose.35 Moreover, a state's use of armed force in response to prior
armed attack is permissible unless it can be proven that the responding state
had previously consented to a rule prohibiting said action.36
Applying the working definition of terrorism 37 to the embassy bombings,
the actions: constituted violent attacks; were committed to further
fundamentalist terrorist political and religious objectives; and were intended
to target Western, primarily American, interests.3" Thus, it is not surprising
that the U.S. responded to such blatant terrorist violations of American soil.
III. To CONDEMN OR TO CONDONE?
Because these tentative definitions of terrorism are not legally universal,
they run the risk of stalling permissible state actions and leave unanswered
numerous questions of international law.39 How can a victimized state
legally react to its aggressor? Which actions will the U.N. condone and
which will it condemn as excessively forceful?
32. See generally ELIZABETH BURGOS, Mi CHiAMO RIGOBERTA MENCHU (2d ed. 1999). The
infliction of violence upon an innocent group of people, with the intention of instilling fear
to achieve the political objective of subjecting the same people to a virtually totalitarian
regime which prohibits the peoples traditions and rights, while furthering the objective of
illustrating to other populations how they will also be treated in the case of public
denunciation of the government does fit the mold of terrorism. While typically these terrorist
actions involve one territorial group violating another state, many Latin American
governments do terrorize indigenous populations in ways that are very similar to terrorist
crimes (e.g. kidnaping, murder, bombings, village raids). Moreover, when applying the
defined characteristics of terrorist attacks to these governmental actions, it is possible to
notice a convergence between the characteristics of both. See generally id.
33. See Beck & Arend, note 8, at 165.
34. Muhammad Saleem, Missile Strikes Violate Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998,
at A20.
35. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 158.
36. Id. at 159.
37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text
38. Hedges, supra note 9, at 1.
39. Id.
2000]
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A. The U.N. Charter
According to the language of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, members
are prohibited from forcibly acting against the territorial integrity and
political independence of other states.4' This provision applies primarily to
U.N. member states, yet non-member countries have also been customarily
held to this standard." What remains unclear is whether this Article also
prohibits the actions of private actors such as terrorists.42
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter explains that a state has an imminent right
of self-defense when it has suffered attack.43 Before taking any action, the
state must immediately consult with the Security Council of the U.N. on the
counter action it wishes to adopt. 4 The state must then use appropriate
measures to maintain peace and international security.45
While most nations acknowledge the right of self-defense in the case of
armed attack, many disagree on what specific terrorist actions-or whether
any at all-give rise to that right.46 The best way to conceptualize these
different legal interpretations of Article 51 is to envision them upon a
spectrum. 47 On one end of the spectrum is the suggestion that states may
respond only to actual attacks within their own territory.48 On the other end
is the belief that threatened attacks on nationals, even those traveling abroad,
will justify a state's forcible response.49 In the middle of the spectrum are
those who advocate the use of force as dependent on each individual
circumstance.5 Under this interpretation an isolated attack may not be
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
41. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 171; Herman Mosler, The International Society as a
Legal Community, 140 RECUEIL DE COURS 283 (1974).
42. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 171.
43. JORGE A. GONZALEZ RAMjREZ, LA AGRESION: SU CONCEPTO EN LOS TRATADOS Y
ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES 124 (1983).
44. Id.
45. The measures are not defined. See id,
46. Francis A. Boyle, Military Responses to Terrorism: Remarks of Francis A. Boyle, 81
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 288, 294 (1987).
47. See generally Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 196.
48. Boyle, supra note 46, at 293. For example, China and Russia who have used their power
of veto to indicate their disapproval of American Foreign Policy.
49. Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV.
89, 96 (1989). This is the view held by the U.S. and Israel, the two countries most targeted
by terroristic attack.
50. James Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and Procedural
Constraints in International Law, 81 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 307, 314 (1987).
[Vol. 20
2000] AMERICAN RESPONSE TO EMBASSY ATTACKS 99
considered enough to respond, while large scale, continuing attacks might
call for action.5 These interpretations of self-defense reveal the range of
conservative and liberal readings of Article 5 1.52
From a strict constructionist perspective, a state could only exercise self-
defense in the event of an actual or at least imminent armed attack.53 This
interpretation would limit a state's right to act against the mere threat of
terrorism.54 Therefore, strict constructionists would probably disapprove of
the American response to the embassy bombings.
In contrast to such "high threshold" interpretations,55 other views do not
construe self-defense as a straight jacket.56 claiming that it would be a grave
mistake to read Article 51 as an absolute prohibition of military responses to
terrorism.57 In support of this view, the U.S. suggests that isolated attacks on
nationals abroad are enough to justify a state's right of response58 and that the
inherent scope of the right of self-defense will be dangerously diluted if




54. FRANCIS A. FROWEIN, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-
Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 55, 66 (1988). In his discussion of the use of force, Frowein
claims that a state's use of force to protect its citizens from terrorist threats has a high
threshold. Later, Frowein seems to dismiss this assertion, stating that the current state of the
law provides that states shall not use force to protect citizens threatened by terrorists on the
territory of another state, unless that state fails to cooperate in order to remove the threat.
See id.
55. Id.
56. Alberto Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81
PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. 297-301 (1987). Coll asserts that any attacks which affect military
personnel and other agents of the state can best be interpreted and described as implied acts
of war. These acts of war provide the victim state with ample justification under the laws of
war for a response. Coll defines terrorism more narrowly as an explicit and deliberate
destruction or threat of destruction of non-military, non-governmental personnel in the course
of political or other forms of warfare.
57. Id. at 307. Coll's views on terrorism are in stark contrast with high threshold advocates.
Other scholars have argued that terrorism does not fit within normal concepts of self-defense
under Article 51. Article 51 deals with blatant armed attack, but is not easily extended to
situations involving covert acts of terrorism. See John F. Murphy, Military Responses to
Terrorism: Remarks of John F. Murphy, 81 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 319 (1987).
58. Coil, supra note 56, at 307. Coll sees self-defense as consisting of the measures
necessary to protect the state and its people from outside armed attack in all its conventional
and unconventional forms, including terrorism.
59. Sofaer, supra note 49, at 96.
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Along with the U.S., Israel supports a broad interpretation of Article 5 1.60
Together, they claim that the machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes
has been variable and insufficient 6' and that the U.N. Charter model for
collective security is problematic.62 Arguing that many contemporary
conflicts take the form of subversive interventions, indirect aggressions and
transitional revolutionary warfare emphasizing terrorism,63 the U.S. and
Israel assert that restricting Article 51 would run the risk of immunizing
those who sporadically attack a state, even if they do so repeatedly.64
Interestingly, Israel and the U.S. are the only states that have repeatedly
retaliated against terrorist attacks.65
The U.S. and Israel argue that a state should be allowed to implement
measures it reasonably considers necessary to counter unlawful terrorist
attacks.66 This plan also allows for Security Council rejection if the state
responds disproportionately to the provocation.
67
Influenced by the U.S. and Israel, international law limits state actions in
certain cases, while generally giving states broad discretion to respond when
attacked.6" According to the U.N. Charter, self-defense is a right not immune
from the humanitarian laws applicable to armed conflicts.69
The U.N. places several limitations on self-defense. First, any use of
force used must be in furtherance of self-defense.7 ° Second, Article 51
60. William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counter-Terror
Operations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 462,470 (1990). O'Brien suggests that the following terrorist
actions might justify state self-defense responses: armed attack against a state's territory,
hostage-taking within and beyond the state's territory, and armed attack on state nationals
abroad. From the last example, one can presume that the U.S. could have legitimately
responded to the African embassy attacks by bombing the aggressor state. The new problem
facing the U.S. response to the embassy bombings is that there is no single terrorist state, and
that Afghanistan and Sudan did not have any involvement with the African attacks. Given
these factors, it becomes much more difficult to determine whether the U.S. acted within the




64. Sofaer, supra note 49, at 95-96.
65. See Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 196.
66. Id.
67. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 206.
68. Timothy J. Heverin, Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons: Environmental
and Humanitarian Limits on Self-Defense, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1277, 1281 (1997).
69. Id. at 1278.
70. Id. at 1286.
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requires that a defending state report all planned responsive measures to the
Security Council.71 Third, such action must not interfere with the Security
Council's function of maintaining and restoring international peace.72 Fourth,
the self-defense measure must meet the standards of necessity and
proportionality.73 Fifth, there must be some link between the target of a
forcible response and those responsible for the initial armed attack.74
Notwithstanding these limits, no one body of international law obligates
a nation to forego a legitimate military target simply because doing so may
violate one of these limitations.75 Rather, these laws provide the U.N. with
an outline to determine whether a state action is permissible, and give an
acting state an umbrella under which it may justify its military attacks.
Nonetheless, states continue to be affected by terrorism and remain
confused as to how to react. Contemporary international law does not
address the subtler modes of terrorism characteristic of the twentieth
century.76 Article 51 simply was not designed to cope with modern day
terrorism.77
IV. POST-1945 STATE ACTIONS
Amidst the confusion generated by unclear definitions and questionable
state capacity to respond to terrorist actions, the U.N. has tried to determine
whether the 1998 American cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan
were a legitimate response.7" The issue remains unresolved despite precedent
showing that states have traditionally defended their military personnel,
citizens, and property from attack when no actual threat existed to their
territory or independence was revealed.79 Historical precedent illuminates




74. RICHARD J. ERIKSON, THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-
SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 38, 95-126 (1989).
75. Gregory F. Intoccia, American Bombing ofLibya: An International Legal Analysis, 19
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177, 211 (1987).
76. See Coil, supra note 56, at 300.
77. See generally Islamic Radicals Threaten US., SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 7, 1998 , at
A17.
78. Id.
79. Hedges, supra note 9, at 1.
80. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 174.
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historical perspective gives it the ability to determine what it will and will not
tolerate.8'
Since World War II, states have reacted to terrorism in many ways: by
abducting or attempting to abduct suspect terrorists; by assassinating
terrorists; by using military strikes against terrorist bases; and by staging
military strikes against states allegedly involved in terrorism.82 The
American response to the embassy bombings fits well into this scheme.
Three of the aforementioned actions-attempted assassination, strikes
against military bases, and strikes against another state hosting a suspected
terrorist-were utilized by the U.S.83 Yet American intentions in regards to
the missile attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan remain unclear.
It can certainly can be argued that the U.S. was trying to assassinate bin
Laden by bombing some of his camps in Afghanistan.84 In fact, the Clinton
Administration publicized that military bases were targeted in the hopes of
exposing bin Laden, who might have been taken there.85 Yet, how did Sudan
factor in when the U.S. decided to bomb a pharmaceutical plant? What of
the U.S. pursuing a single man by bombing countries not directly linked to
the circumstances that set its responsive policy in motion? Can this morally
extreme action bejustified through self-defense rights and historical custom?
States have seldom undertaken large-scale military operations in response
to terrorism. 6 Only four separate abductions of alleged terrorists have been
attempted.87 Ofthese Israel attempted to abduct airplanes three times and the
U.S. made the other attempt.8 In all four instances, the coercive actions
81. Saleem, supra note 34, at A20.
82. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 174. A discussion of state interventions to protect or
rescue nationals will not be included in this Note's analysis of state actions in response to
terrorism. Such rescue actions are not relevant because they typically involve a state's
interest in rescuing its endangered nationals, rather than the state's interest in punishing
terrorism.
83. See id..
84. Embassy on Military Alert, TIMEs (London) Aug. 18, 1998 at 12.
85. Islamic Radicals Threaten U.S., SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 7, 1998 at A17.
86. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 174.
87. See Elaine Sciolino, For the U.S., a Deceptive Lull in Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1987, at A2. Not included in this review is the abduction by the U.S. of Fawaz Younis, an
alleged Lebanese Shiite terrorist. In September of 1987, U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation agents arrested Younis in international waters in the Mediterranean after he
"voluntarily" boarded a vessel there. Although Lebanese Justice Minister Nabih Berri
criticized the American action as "an act close to piracy" and "an attack on the honor of
Lebanon," it engendered little other international reaction. Id.
88. Id.
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were futile and both states were unable to gain jurisdiction over the
individuals they had sought to capture. 9 Significantly, while all abduction
attempts faltered, the international community reacted harshly only to the
Israeli interceptions.9" Both nations claimed they acted in legitimate self-
defense.9' Nonetheless, the U.N. chastised Israel, asserting that the
commitment to the rule of law of international affairs imposes restraints on
the methods states can use to protect themselves against those who operate
outside the law.9"
A. The United States and the Achille Lauro Incident
An abduction of alleged terrorists was also attempted by the U.S. 93 In
October 1985, four members of the Palestine Liberation Front ("PLF")
hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro and threatened to kill the boat's
passengers unless Israel released fifty imprisoned Palestinians. 94 Asserting
that they would starting killing Americans first, the terrorists killed one
American Jew.
The U.S. acted quickly but in vain. Yet, the U.N. did not criticize the
U.S. for its response.95 Does the status of the U.S. as a strong member state
influence the U.N.'s reactions? 96 What of the fact that similar actions were
reacted to differently when it was a weaker state implementing them?97
While some international legal scholars condemned the attempted U.S.
abduction as illegal, the U.N. remained largely silent.9" Both Italy and Egypt
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 189.
92. Brian Duffy, US. Orders Some Personnel in Pakistan to Leave amid New Threats of
Attacks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1998, at 28-30.
93. ANTONIO CASSESE, VIOLENCE AND LAW IN THE MODERN AGE, 63-64 (1988).
94. Id.
95. For arguments that the U.S. action was illegal, see id. and Oscar Schachter, In Defense
ofInternational Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 140 (1986).
96. Safdar I. Chaudhary, Muslims as a Whole Are Not to Blame for the Acts of a Few,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 15, 1998.
97. Both Italy and Egypt had transmitted protests to Washington for violation of their air
space and the illegal hijacking of an aircraft. Nevertheless, the Security Council made
virtually no mention of the American use of force. U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2622d mtg. at
38-46, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2622 (1985). The Israeli delegate, in sharp contrast, spoke of the
courageous American act directed against Palestinian terrorism which represents an essential
step towards the eradication of global terrorism. Id. at 53-55.
98. Id.
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transmitted notes of protest to Washington,99 but the Security Council made
virtually no mention of the American use of force in its October 11, 1985
discussions.1 0
B. Other Israeli Actions Against Terrorism
For the third time, Israel tried to intercept another aircraft in 1986. In
reaction, the U.S. claimed that because the abduction was undertaken without
adequate prior evidence of terrorist action, Israel's actions were illegal.10 '
Expounding on its personal interpretation ofjus ad bellum it claimed a state
may respond only when it is the victim of continuous attacks. 2
Having already been subjected to harsh criticism, Israel was subsequently
admonished for its alleged involvement in the assassination of Kahlil El-
Wazir in 1988 and the kidnapping of Sheik Obeid in 1989.'0° Since the mid-
1960s, Israel regularly struck against alleged terrorist bases; in virtually all
instances Israel was acting against states such as Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, and
Lebanon. 4 Tunisia's State Department Legal Advisor, Abraham D. Sofaer,
vehemently asserted that a State may not act secretly and without public
justification in its self-defense.'0 5 Once again, the White House responded
by declaring that the Israeli action was an understandable expression of self-
defense which nonetheless cannot be condoned.1
0 6
C. American Bombings in Libya and Iraq
Has the U.S. been required to justify its bombings despite tentative
evidence of bin Laden's involvement in the Africa bombings? Has the U.S.
been allowed to act with more leeway given its influence on world economy?
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Antonio Cassese, The International Community's "Legal" Response to Terrorism, 38
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 589, 603-4 (1989).
102. Robert J. Beck et al., "Don't Tread On Us ": International Law and Forcible State
Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L.J. 153, 177 (1994).
103. Israel Dismisses Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1989, at 6.
104. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 182.
105. See generally Sofaer, supra note 49.
106. Michel Reisman, No Man's Land: International Legal Regulation of Coercive
Responses to Protracted and Low Level Conflict, 11 HOUS. J. INT'L. L. 317 (1989).
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Until June of 1993, the U.S. air raid on Libya was the only military strike
directed against a state linked to terrorism."°7 While the Reagan attack
elicited overwhelming support at home, it generated much criticism
abroad. °8 Ultimately, a Security Council resolution condemning America
was vetoed by the U.S., Great Britain, and France, amounting to nothing
more than a proverbial slap on the wrist. 9
Seven years after Libya, America employed a remarkably similar forcible
action against Iraq."' In an address to the nation, President Clinton "never
mentioned the 'U.N. Charter' or 'international law' per se," instead he
legally argued that self-defense and deterrence justified this American action
against terrorism."' Again, the U.N. remained silent."'
D. Common State Responses to Terrorism
After scrutinizing post-1945 responses to terrorist attacks, a number of
general conclusions regarding state forcible responses can be drawn." 3 First,
there have been relatively few responses to terrorism, excluding actions
against alleged bases." 4 Second, virtually every state response was staged
107. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 185.
108. E.J. Dionne, Jr., West Europe Generally Critical of U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986,
at A16.
109. See Three Nations Veto U.N. Censure ofLibya Raid, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22,1986, at 17.
Prior to the veto, Australia and Denmark voted against the resolution. Id.
110. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 188. Once again, a nighttime air strike on terrorist-
linked targets in the Middle East was followed by an evening national broadcast by President
Clinton. Id.
111. Id. President Clinton argued that "the Iraqi attack against President Bush" had
constituted "an attack against our country and against all Americans." In view of
"compelling evidence" of this plot, "a firm and commensurate response was essential to
protect our sovereignty, to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism,
to deter further violence against our people, and to affirm the expectation of civilized
behavior among nations." Id.
112. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, 189-92. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine
Albright sought to explain the U.S. forcible actions to the U.N. Security Council and
Albright's Security Council colleagues either supported or failed to reject Albright's legal
argument which explained that the U.S. responded directly, as it is entitled to do under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides for the exercise of self-defense in such cases.
113. Id.
114. Id. Since 1945, "there appear to have been just four prominent cases of attempted
state abduction of suspected terrorists. Only counter-base actions have been conducted with
any frequency, on the average about once per year since the mid- 1 960s, and these often have
taken the form of small-scale commando operations or air-strikes." Id.
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in or around the Middle East.115 Third, only Israel and the U.S. have
responded to terrorism.' 16 Significantly, both nations have been the targets
of terrorist activities and have had the military technology to respond to
them. 117 Fourth, at best the method to gauge the effectiveness of taken
measures remains arbitrary given that most state actions taken were
tactically unsuccessful, caused collateral causalities, or both.'18 Fifth, while
both the U.S. and Israel were criticized for their military force uses, politics
influenced the U.N.' reactions to counter-terrorist operations, privileging
America." 9
V. IN THE NAME OF GOD: THE BIN LADEN STRUGGLE
Given the dramatic transformations of modem terrorist practices, the
U.N.'s task of dealing with terrorism and state responses to it remains
difficult.12 ° In the 1980s it was possible to speak of a leader of a terrorist
group, the size of said group, its capabilities, and its modus operandi.12 ,
Today's organizations are much more fluid, making it difficult to speak of an
order of battle and intelligence. 122 States are now forced to see terrorism as
constellations of groups which randomly pool members and resources
together, complicating Western intelligence efforts to identify those
responsible for violence. 123 Isama bin Laden travels among these groups and





118. Among those actions that might be so judged are the following: the, 1973, 1985, and
1986 aircraft interceptions, after which not a single suspected terrorist was taken into custody
by the state using force; the 1982 assassination of Sheik Musawi, which killed the Shiite
cleric's wife, his six-year old son, and five bodyguards and which may well have been a
bungled abduction attempt; the 1986 U.S. air strike against Libya, which killed Colonel
Qadhafi's stepdaughter and damaged a number of civilian areas; and the 1993 U.S. attack
on Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters, which caused the deaths of eight civilians. Eric
Schmitt, U.S. Says Strike Crippled Iraq's Capacity for Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993,
at Al. See also Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 191.
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The landscape of foreign policy matters has also evolved rapidly, leaving
the U.S. without a sole, readily-identifiable enemy.125 Instead of worrying
about any military threat from the former Soviet Union, the U.S. now worries
about terrorism.126 Yet stopping interchangeable terrorists is more difficult
than dealing with one large enemy. 2 7 The threat of terrorism victimizes us
as much as the actual violence it produces.
I2 1
The bombings of the American embassies signal this new era of terrorist
conflict, one which also pits Islamic militants against the West. 29 It now
appears that where an American is attacked, the attack is enough to justify
employing necessary and proportionate responsive actions.'30 At least, this
was how the U.S. framed its justification for showering Afghanistan and
Sudan with over seventy-five Tomahawk missiles. 3'
A. The Face Behind the Fire
Indeed, the African bombings could not be controlled by the U.S., and
instilled a very real fear in the West. But how will American relations to the
states from which the terrorist acts are being committed be affected? How
has the U.S. prepared to deal with the changing world of subversive politics?
Who is bin Laden, the man many fundamentalists protect with their life,
whose political vision represented the new face of terrorism at the turn of the
millennium?
A young, wealthy, member of the Saudi Arabian elite, bin Laden studied
engineering and first came to Afghanistan to fight Soviet invaders. 3 2 He
inherited $300 million from his late father. Later estranged from his family,
and his Saudi assets frozen by the Saudi regime, bin Laden nonetheless
125. Roger K. Lowe, Foreign-Policy Complexities Pose Challenge; U.S. Senate, COLUMBUS




129. Larry Habegger and James O'Reilly, Islamic Terrorists TargetAmericans World Wide,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 6, 1998, at A25.
130. Beck & Arend, supra note 8, at 199.
131. Taliban Vows to Protect Suspect in U.S. Embassy Blasts 'At Any Cost', HOUSTON
CHRON., Nov. 6, 1998, at A25.
132. Vernon Loeb, A Global, Pan-Islamic Network; Terrorism Entrepreneur Unifies
Groups Financially, Politically, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1998, at Al. Ironically, this effort
which was largely supported by the American government.
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multiplied his fortune, and today his interests lead him far beyond the Middle
East.'33
From an unknown location, bin Laden presides over a loose transnational
network of fundamentalist organizations who have made him a leader of no
known citizenship. He uses money, ideology, and terror to challenge the
security of the world's most powerful state.'34 Bin Laden's goal is to foment
a religious struggle that will unify the world's one billion Muslims. 3 He
explains that "the Islamic world is a single state based on the righteousness
and piety of its people; it is a single nation with one religion."'1
36
Bin Laden's efforts have drawn together thousands to topple what they
regard as corrupt Western regimes. 137 His associations have attracted the
alliance of men such as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center, 13 and yet his involvement in terrorism
remains purely speculative. 
13
The U.S. credited bin Laden for his efforts to fight against the Soviets in
Afghanistan.' But when, bin Laden established the al-Qaida-the Islamic
Salvation Foundation-near the end of the war, American support
vanished."' These circumstances foreshadow the relationship's subsequent
effect upon Afghanistan. 1
42
Afghanistan's effort to expel Soviet influence was strongly supported by
the U.S. The U.S. provided training and weapons for the democratic fighters.
However, after the war ended and the Soviets were duly defeated, the U.S.
abandoned Afghanistan to its own internal struggle. 1"' When it wages an
undeclared war against opposition to democratic regimes, the U.S.
exemplifies how states at times fail to condemn and occasionally even
celebrate violent acts when these acts serve its political ends.'44 How then
should the Middle East perceive America's hostility towards bin Laden and
his greater cause in light of its past encouragement of him?
133. Id.
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Some journalists feel that the tendency to regard bin Laden as a lunatic
millionaire and prince of terrorism may only be adding to his stature.'45
Others claim that America's pursuit of bin Laden might invite more attacks
since he serves metaphorically as a terrorist Internet to which other terrorists
may plug in, an information highway of hatred on which dissatisfaction with
American imperialism is voiced and given a cause.146
Curiously, there is no evidence that bin Laden actually fought against the
Soviets, but he was an incredible fundraiser for the war and did ingratiate
many Islamic extremists on the basis of his monetary contributions.
1 47
Through his fatwas, 48 bin Laden mobilized Islamic groups to fight against
America "until they see the face of God."'149 He went so far as to offer
bounties of between $10,000 and $50,000 for each American death, leading
the U.S. to issue a fresh security alert. 50 "Crusaders" (intended to describe
European and American Christian powers), "Jews", and "Zionists" have been
identified as Islam's foremost enemies.1
5 1
Responding quickly and strongly to these threats and the African
bombings, the U.S. announced that it would not rest, would not forget, and
would pursue every last murderer.'52 U.S. Secretary of the State Albright
explained that the U.S. would wage an aggressive war against terrorism.
153
Holding to its vows, the U.S. fronted the most extensive overseas criminal
investigation in American history.'54 But can the U.S. legitimately justify its
need for retaliation when only twelve American citizens died in Africa and
it failed to communicate with the Security Council before acting?'55
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Aug. 27, 1998, at 87.
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147. Hedges, supra note 9, at 1.
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152. Andrew Miga, Bomb Suspects in U.S. Hands, Terrorists' Capture is Major Break, The
BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 28, 1998, at 29.
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155. Lyle Denniston, Suspect Charged in Kenya Bombing; Yemenite Admits Role in U.S.
Embassy Blast, Expected Martyrdom, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 28, 1998, at Al. It is useful to
remember that according to U.S. property law, U.S. embassies abroad are considered
national territory. Thus, even if it could be argued that the number of dead Americans was
nominal in the August 7, 1998 bombings, the U.S. could still legally defend its national
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Significantly, the complex legal and diplomatic roadblocks to bringing
suspects to the U.S. for prosecution were surmounted by international
cooperation.156 As of today, any suspects related to the African bombings
risk the death penalty in a variety ofjurisdictions.'57 It is also not unusual for
suspects to be charged in American courts given that embassies are
considered national soil and are covered by U.S. Criminal law.158 Ironically,
bin Laden has not been captured despite extensive efforts. 5 9
Perhaps his constant authorities may be more the result of Western
attitudes towards terrorism than the result of bin Laden's own extensive
capabilities. As previously mentioned, the U.S. and the West at large have
had a historical tendency to look for a single villain or a single headquarters
of an evil empire, then focus upon and eliminate it. 6° It is those actions
which solve problems and end fears that have been most supported. 6'
Indeed, Americans may have been targeted worldwide by a terrorist
network that is not geographically centered.'62 Yet, it is also true that "far
more Americans were killed in the past year by lightning than by terrorists
and, unless large-scale terrorist incidents occur, that fact will not change" 63
But part of the problem with terrorism is that while the pragmatic West
regards warfare as a finite undertaking, the fundamentalists do not.'64
Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, allegedly responsible for the embassy bombings,
embodies this perceptual difference.'65 While Odeh denied being directly
involved in the bombing, he nonetheless accepted the charges brought against




159. Perhaps bin Laden's success in not being captured reveals how many militant groups
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160. Hedges, supra note 9, at 1.
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163. Id. Showing how perhaps American needs to quell any critique of its 'regime' may be
driven more by U.S. psychology of fear of the other, in this case, the Islamic other, than by
the actual, physical threat that these cultures pose to the U.S..
164. Hedges, supra note 9.
165. John J. Goldman, Kenya Bombing Suspect Admits Bin Laden Link, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
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him out of loyalty to Bin Laden and his cause.' 66 Do these facts legitimate
American panic and consequential military action? The answer is a difficult
one to reach.
President Clinton justified the air strikes by claiming that the U.S. had
incriminating evidence against bin Laden in connection to the embassy
bombings.167 Yet, he failed to reveal that evidence. 6 8 The U.S. was once
again in a legal gray area, because international law provides states have the
right to strike at a territory launching terrorist attacks.'69 However, proof of
such activity inevitably affects a state's ability to resort to serious remedial
measures. 7 Even with no evidence offered against bin Laden, America was
permitted to attack its perceived aggressor' 7' irrespective of Pakistani
complaints for violations of their national airspace 172 and the twenty-one
civilian casualties that resulted. 
17
The Taliban, the ruling fundamentalist group in Afghanistan,
characterized the Tomahawk attack as attempting to kill a fly with a
cannon.74 Angrily, the Taliban condemned America for leaving Pakistan in
an extremely difficult position. 75  The U.S. missile strike humiliated
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's moderate Islamic government and
led to massive protests. 76 Moreover, it left the administration stranded
between its fear of domestic protest and its desperate need for U.S. and
International Monetary Fund assistance.
77
Currently, in the Islamic world, 78 many Muslims are confused and
saddened by the terrorist events and fear that the acts of a select few may lead
166. Stephen J. Hedges and Lisa Anderson, U.S. Indicts Bin Laden, Five Aides in Global
Terrorism Plot, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 5, 1998, at 1.
167. Arthur Brice, Terror Suspect Says Now It's War, U.S. Ready, Says Official : "We're
Going to Be on the Offense as Well as Defense, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Aug. 22, 1998, at
Al.
168. Hedges, supra note 9, at i.
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to further stereotyping of the Islamic world broadening the chasm between
Muslim and Western interactions. 179 Others describe America as a fair
weather friend who treats Middle Eastern populations as second class
citizens; important only when they are furthering American interests. 
180
That U.S. actions will have a direct bearing on long term U.S. foreign
policy seems clear. 181 Yet, the real problem with terrorism may not be about
bin Laden, a single man.182 To many Muslims, the 1990s represent a decade
of disillusion with the West: "the perception being that beyond oil and Israel;
the U.S. does not care about the region., 183 Among many Muslims, bin
Laden is seen as a true believer, one who does not need money or power and
is standing up against the corruption of the West and Israel. 184 Moreover,
because bin Laden has lived in Afghanistan for over 15 years, it is unlikely
his host will push him into the angry hands of an American tribunal.
85
On repeated occasions, the Afghani government has stated that if
America has evidence, it should produce it.1 86 Once again, the time has come
for American policy makers to consider the price that is still being paid for
their anti-Communist alliance with Muslim extremists during the previous
generation. 187
VI. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the African bombings, the world has come to see that
post-Cold War international terrorism can no longer be defined by
geographical or group-specific limitations. On the contrary, it has to be taken
as a symptomatic reaction to Western cultural imperialism.
"Since the Embassy bombings, the U.S. government has pursued bin
Laden on several tracks, using military strikes, and diplomacy as well as the
179. Emily Wax, U.S. Strikes Back/Pakistanis Use Parade To Reflect on Peace, NEWSDAY
(New York), Aug. 24, 1998, at A05.





185. YoussefM. Ibrahim, Taliban Aide Casts Doubt on Giving up Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1998, at A8.
186. Taliban Promises to Protect Suspected Terrorist Bin Laden, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 6,
1998, A20; Taliban Won't Yield Bin Laden; Militia Rejects Link to Embassy Blasts,
NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 6, 1998, at A16.
187. John K. Cooley, Old Allies of No Help in Nailing Terrorist, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Aug. 24, 1998, at 9B.
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most extensive overseas law enforcement investigation in American
history."'88 All efforts, including the shower of Tomahawk missile, have
failed to roust him. 89 While state-sponsored terrorism can be addressed by
diplomatic and economic sanctions, it appears that little leverage is possible
against groups such as bin Laden's 90
Military force has long been used as a tool of diplomacy when dealing
with the Middle East. 9 ' Yet, while a historical argument for state responses
to terrorist attack supports American involvement in Afghanistan and Sudan,
legally justifying the military action presents problems.'92 Has America
convinced the world that it needed to act with force?'93
The U.S. missile attacks have not changed policy, but they have changed
the language of justification. 94 American officials legally justified the
attacks against Afghanistan and Sudan as preemptive strikes needed to
prevent bin Laden from further attacking American interests.' 95 Yet,
answering with bombs is a luxury only the world's, last superpower can
afford, even at a high price.196 Part of this cost is the counter-productive
effect retaliatory actions have on innocent civilians. More seriously, such
acts strain global rules of law which the U.S. asserts directly and through the
Security Council. 197
But now that American precedent has provided an easy means of
justifying almost any responsive action, the U.N. charter may receive
188. Bin Laden Formally Charged in Embassy Bombings; IndictmentAlso Accuses Islamic
Radical of Plotting to Kill Americans World Wide, BUFFALO TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at 4A.
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unprecedented use.198 If every country claimed the right to strike back in this
way, the world might soon descend into anarchy.'99 The bin Laden network
is now portrayed as the prime terrorist threat (a position once occupied by
Syria, Libya, and North Korea). 200 But there will certainly be new candidates
in the future, just as the U.S. has acted unilaterally and will do so again.20'
"There is little precedent in international law for military attacks which
cross national borders to strike at organizations which operate independently
of government sponsorship."2 2 However, it is likely that the American claim
of self-defense will withstand diplomatic scrutiny in the U.N. and other
forums, 2°3 while the success of the military air strikes may continue to remain
as elusive as bin Laden himself.
2 4
Most probably, the principle benefits of the attacks dealt with the
psychological dimensions of power.20 5 Answering the embassy bombings
with strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan boosted the terrorized American
morale.20 6 It does not seem to matter that bin Laden emerged from a covert
war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan nor that the pursuit of a single
individual will not solve the problem for the West.
198. Peterson, supra note 191, at 1.
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Terrorism has to be fought through a variety of measures, some of which
include forceful military attacks. Yet, these efforts will be vain if not
coupled with political strategies addressing the causes of terrorism itself.
These have more to do with poverty, unemployment, injustice, and the
deprivation of rights, than with a fundamentalist madman.
Federica Bisone

